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I. Introduction 
Calls of in-the-money convertible securities are 
reexamined in light of a short-run liquidity cost 
explanation of observed price behavior. In the 
scenario described below the announcement of a 
conversion-forcing call heralds the beginning of 
a period of abnormally high sell-order volume in 
the calling firm's common stock. Market dealers 
respond to the order imbalances by lowering 
prices to deter sellers and attract buyers. Thus, 
observed negative stock price reactions to call 
announcements contain a transitory component 
reflecting the price of liquidity in the capital mar- 
kets. The evidence we report is broadly consis- 
tent with predictions related to the liquidity ex- 
planation for stock price reactions to convertible 
bond calls and is partially consistent for calls of 
convertible preferred stocks. 
The liquidity hypothesis presented below joins 
several other possible explanations for observed 
Firms' announcements 
to call in-the-money 
convertible securities 
for redemption essen- 
tially force their con- 
version into common 
stock, and such an- 
nouncements are gen- 
erally met with signifi- 
cant reductions in the 
calling firms' equity 
values. An explanation 
based on liquidity costs 
is advanced and tested. 
The explanation im- 
plies that investors 
who choose to sell 
their shares early in the 
conversion period bear 
liquidity costs by sell- 
ing at reduced prices. 
Consistent with the ex- 
planation, the average 
share price decline is 
short-lived, lasting 
most of the conversion 
period. Thus, a compo- 
nent of the call an- 
nouncement effect ap- 
pears to be due to 
liquidity costs. 
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negative stock price reactions to calls of in-the-money convertible 
bonds and preferred stocks (Mikkelson 1981, 1985; Mais, Moore, and 
Rogers 1989). Mikkelson (1985) finds evidence that lost interest tax 
shields due to calling convertible bonds account for at least some of 
the negative announcement effect. However, this explanation cannot 
extend to the negative effects of calls of convertible preferred stocks 
because preferred dividends do not provide tax shields. Information 
signaling is suggested as a theoretical explanation by Harris and Raviv 
(1985) for (1) the adverse stock price effects and (2) the reality that 
convertible bond calls are typically delayed until the convertibles are 
substantially in the money (Ingersoll 1977b).1 Their model has found 
empirical support in the evidence reported by Ofer and Natarajan 
(1987), though some of their most persuasive evidence is shown to be 
critically sensitive to the choice of estimation period for the return- 
generating process used in their study (Cowan, Nayar, and Singh 
1990). Moreover, the predictions of the model set forth by Harris and 
Raviv (1985) do not extend in an obvious way to calls of convertible 
preferred stocks, though perhaps a signaling argument can be made 
that would explain the negative price effect observed for these securi- 
ties as well. 
Though no single explanation set forth so far has found general sup- 
port across different types of security calls, negative stock price reac- 
tions to call announcements represent an empirical regularity that may 
be partially explained by short-run liquidity costs. A liquidity-based 
explanation of stock price behavior around calls of convertible bonds 
and preferred stocks is set forth in Section II. Evidence of negative 
equity valuation effects due to calls of both types of convertible securi- 
ties is reported in Section III, and stock price behavior before and 
after the announcement period also is examined in that section. For 
our combined sample of 169 calls of convertible bonds and preferred 
stocks, we find a significant negative average abnormal return of about 
1.9% for the 2-day announcement period, consistent with the negative 
effects documented by Mikkelson (1981) for convertible bond calls and 
by Mais, Moore, and Rogers (1989) for convertible preferred stock 
calls. For the period following announcement ending on the last day on 
1. In perfect capital markets with zero call notice period, Ingersoll (1977a) and Bren- 
nan and Schwartz (1977, 1980) show that the optimal policy is to call when stock value 
just equals the effective call price, i.e., the stated call price plus accrued interest. An 
alternative explanation for delayed calls is set forth by Constantinides and Grundy 
(1987). If calling is costly, the firm will rationally delay if voluntary conversion by 
the convertible security holders is anticipated. Jaffee and Shleifer (1990) offer another 
explanation for delayed calls based on avoidance of financial distress. Given a positive 
call notice period, the firm will rationally wait until a convertible security is well in the 
money to minimize the chance that it will be out of the money by the call date. If the 
security goes out of the money, the firm is faced with redeeming for cash a large security 
issue, and this may lead to financial distress. 
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which conversion is possible, we find a significant positive cumulative 
average abnormal return of about 2.2%, suggesting that a component 
of the announcement effect is transitory. Tests of the liquidity-based 
explanation are reported in Section IV. We show that stock prices 
rebound significantly following announcements of convertible bond 
calls. That is, those stocks that decline the most upon announcement 
tend to regain the most during the period of conversion. No evidence 
of rebounding following calls of convertible preferred stocks is found. 
The combined findings are interpreted and summarized in Section V. 
II. Liquidity Effects of Calls of Convertible Securities 
Short-run liquidity costs may arise in "the form of an explicit commis- 
sion or a price away from the equilibrium price" (Kraus and Stoll 1972, 
p. 571). Liquidity costs due to prices set away from equilibrium have 
been detected in the case of block trades by Kraus and Stoll (1972), in 
new equity issues via general cash offers by Barclay and Litzenberger 
(1988), and for equity issue via rights offers by Hansen (1988). Liquid- 
ity costs in the form of explicit dealer compensation as measured by 
the bid-ask spread are detected for secondary equity distributions by 
Mikkelson and Partch (1985). In hypothesizing the behavior of stock 
prices around convertible calls, we follow Kraus and Stoll (1972), Mik- 
kelson and Partch (1985), and others in recognizing that increases in 
supply may lead to long-term price effects due to less than perfectly 
elastic demand, or short-term effects due to liquidity costs. 
A conversion-forcing call in our scenario marks the beginning of a 
period of accelerated trading that is largely seller initiated.2 Rather 
than holding newly converted shares as permanent additions to their 
portfolios, holders of called convertibles may decide to liquidate the 
shares. The decision to liquidate may be based on differences in yields 
and capital gains potential between the convertibles and underlying 
shares, leading to changes in tax liability. If the investor is an institu- 
tion such as a bank, there may be regulatory or policy requirements 
that dictate rebalancing of the portfolio after conversion. Because the 
market value of the convertible will be very close to its conversion 
value after the call announcement, the decision to convert, then sell 
the shares, or to sell the convertible security directly, will rest on 
relative brokerage fees and perhaps the relative speed with which the 
convertibles and the shares can be liquidated. 
In response to an in-the-money call, market makers (specialists) ad- 
just bid and ask prices to deter sellers and attract buyers. If sell orders 
2. During the week of the call announcement, trading volume in our data set increases 
by an average of 44% for bond calls and 38% for preferred calls relative to average 
weekly volume before the announcement. 
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are not reduced sufficiently, or buy orders are not increased suffi- 
ciently by the price change, dealers must temporarily absorb some of 
the shares. For compensation for providing liquidity, a dealer should 
lower bid and ask quotes so that transaction prices are below the 
new long-run equilibrium.3 In this scenario, we are casting convertible 
security calls as "liquidity events" in the sense described by Grossman 
and Miller (1988), and dealers' responses are consistent with various 
models of dealer markets under conditions of inventory risk (Garman 
1976; Stoll 1978; Ho and Stoll 1981; and O'Hara and Oldfield 1986). 
If forced conversion leads to portfolio-rebalancing behavior as we 
have described, the call announcement will be followed by a protracted 
period of high sell-order volume unless bid and ask quotes are kept 
low to deter sellers and attract buyers. We do not know how many 
trades are due to rebalancing, and we cannot pin down when such 
trading takes place in the aftermath of a forced conversion. But the 
scenario is rich enough to allow us to predict that investors who sell 
early in the process will do so at lower prices than those willing to 
wait. Thus, call announcements should result in immediate stock price 
reductions below long-run equilibrium, and prices will begin to recover 
thereafter, continuing until the demand for immediacy by sellers is 
diminished. 
This scenario brings us to view a conversion-forcing call as similar 
to issuance of new common stock via a rights offering in which current 
shareholders receive the right to purchase additional shares, usually 
at a discount. When the rights are exercised the shareholders will then 
have more shares in their portfolios, and they may wish to sell some 
in order to rebalance. The effect is a price decline during a temporary 
period of selling, and a price recovery therafter. The price decline is 
to entice buyers to provide immediacy to sellers, and the loss in portfo- 
lio value suffered by the sellers (original shareholders) represents an 
additional cost of marketing the shares. This is the scenario presented 
by Hansen (1988), and it appears to go far in resolving a long-stand- 
ing paradox in finance.4 Under the scenario presented above, a con- 
version-forcing call also passes some of the task of marketing newly 
issued common shares to security holders, in this case, convertible 
bondholders and preferred stockholders. 
All of the convertible securities examined in this study are issued 
3. The quoted spread is the set of bid and ask prices quoted by the specialist and 
represents the realized spread only if the specialist could execute a buy and a sell 
order simultaneously. The realized spread (Stoll 1989), or effective spread (Roll 1984), 
represents the difference between proximate buy and sell transaction prices. 
4. The paradox, summarized by Brealey and Myers (1991, pp. 359-60), is that under- 
written general cash offers are more expensive than nonunderwritten rights offers in the 
United States, but firms rely predominantly on underwritten general cash offers to mar- 
ket securities. 
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by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or, in a few cases, 
the American Stock Exchange. These exchanges feature continuous 
auction markets with single dealers (specialists) appointed to maintain 
liquid markets for specified securities. The liquidity-based explanation 
for stock price behavior around calls of convertibles predicts a decline 
in stock price upon announcement. This is the same prediction, at least 
for convertible bonds, that arises from the asymmetric information 
model of Harris and Raviv (1985) and the lost tax shield explanation 
supported by Mikkelson (1985). Thus, the liquidity explanation is not 
set forth as an exclusive alternative to other explanations. It supple- 
ments these in suggesting that a component of the announcement pe- 
riod price reaction will be transitory, while not ruling out a permanent 
price change as well. 
III. Stock Price Behavior Surrounding Security Calls 
A. Sample Selection 
The preliminary sample of calls of convertible bonds was identified in 
annual editions of Moody's Industrial Manual. Redemptions of pre- 
ferred stocks are not identified in Moody's, thus the preliminary sam- 
ple was identified by first isolating firms that had convertible preferred 
stock outstanding according to Standard and Poor's Compustat data 
base. Firms that reduced the amount of outstanding convertible pre- 
ferred during a given year were selected as candidates. 
The preliminary samples were subjected to the screening criteria 
enumerated below; the final samples consist of 111 convertible bond 
calls and 58 convertible preferred calls:5 
1. The calling firm's daily rates of return on common stock sur- 
rounding the redemption date must be available on the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) Daily Returns File. This 
requirement effectively limits the sample to only those firms that 
have their common stock listed on either the New York or Ameri- 
can stock exchange. In addition, each conmmon stock is required 
to have at least 100 daily returns recorded in the CRSP file during 
each of the estimation periods described in the next section. 
2. An unambiguous first public announcement of the call decision 
appeared in the Wall Street Journal, and the announcement was 
the only firm-specific news item on that date, or at any time 
during the period from 2 days before to 2 days after that date. 
5. Though the sample selection criteria differ slightly, this should not pose a problem 
for inferences drawn from the analysis. The tests are performed on the combined sample 
and on each subsample independently. 
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TABLE 1 Percentage Increases in Common Shares and Length of Conversion 
Periods for Calls of Convertible Bonds and Preferred Stocks 
Convertible Bond Convertible Preferred 
Calls Calls 
(N = 111) (N = 58) 
Percentage increase in 
common shares: 
Mean 13.2 12.8 
Range 1.0-15.3 .1-36.6 
Length of conversion 
period (in days): 
Mean 27.5 26.5 
Range 16-60 14-56 
3. The effective call date, the last day by which the bonds could be 
converted, was available. 
4. The conversion value of the called security exceeded the call 
price at the time of call; thus the calls are made in the money. 
In table 1, descriptive statistics are presented for the two samples. 
The calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks represent relatively 
large increases in common shares outstanding upon conversion. The 
average ratio of the actual number of shares issued due to conversion 
to the number of shares outstanding before conversion is 13.2% for 
the bonds and 12.8% for the preferred stocks. These average values 
are close to the ratios reported by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) for new issues of common equity. 
The length of time between public announcement and the end of the 
conversion period averages 27.5 trading days for bonds and 26.5 trad- 
ing days for preferred stocks. The length of time varies from 16 to 60 
trading days for bonds and from 14 to 56 days for preferred stocks; 
thus there is substantial variability in the notice periods stipulated by 
the call provisions. 
B. Measurement of Abnormal Returns 
We measure abnormal returns and assess statistical significance of 
various cross-sectional averages of those returns using the market 
model primarily and supplement the analysis with the mean-adjusted 
returns model estimated over identical estimation periods. The abnor- 
mal return (ARi) based on the market model for security j during 
period t is given by equation (1): 
ARjt = Rjt - (& + 3jRmt), (1) 
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where 
Rjt= rate of return of securityj, inclusive of dividends, over day t; 
Rmt = rate of return on the CRSP equal-weighted index, over day t; 
pj = regression parameter estimates. 
Parameter estimates (aj, 1?) are calculated by ordinary least squares. 
Two different 180-day estimation periods were chosen in order to de- 
termine if the findings are sensitive to the choice. We define the 
before-event estimation period as that beginning with t = - 360 and 
ending on t = - 181 relative to the announcement date (AD). Before- 
event estimation was used by Ofer and Natarajan (1987). We define 
the after-event estimation period as that from t = + 181 to t = + 360 
relative to the last day the security can be converted, the conversion 
ending date (CED), plus 20 days. After-event estimation is used by 
Mikkelson (1981) and by Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) and is justi- 
fied given the evidence from Mikkelson (1981) and Cowan, Nayar, and 
Singh (1990) that security calls follow a period of positive abnormal 
price behavior; thus, preevent estimation may lead to biased predic- 
tions in equation (1). 
The cross-sectional average abnormal return (AAR) for day t is cal- 
culated as in equation (2): 
N 
AARt= 1/N3 AR1t. (2) 
j=1 
In equation (2), N denotes sample size. The cumulative average abnor- 
mal return (CAAR) for days aj to bj is given by equation (3): 
N bi 
CAARa, b = 1IN 3ARit. (3) 
j=1 t= aj 
The abnormal return (ARjt) in equation (1) is a regression prediction 
error, thus its standardized form is given by equation (4): 
SARjt = ARjtlSj, (4) 
where 
k2 | ED <1/2 1 (Rmt -R) 
+ + Si ED ED 15 
3(Rmi - R m)2 
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In equation (5), 6-J is the mean square error of the market model, ED 
is the number of days in the estimation period, and Rm denotes the 
sample mean return on the CRSP equal-weighted index during the 
estimation period. 
Over the interval aj to bj, the cross-sectional average cumulative 
standardized abnormal return (ACSAR) is given by equation (6): 
N bj 
ACSARa, b = 1IN I SARjt/ Vb, - aj + 1. (6) 
j=1 t=aj 
Assuming normality of ARjt, with ARjt independent of ARkt, j # k, and 
with ARjt independent of ARj,, s # t, the following test statistic is a 
unit normal random variable:6 
Z = 7N(ACSARa,b) (7) 
C. Stock Price Behavior around Call Announcements 
In table 2, we present cumulative daily average abnormal returns (from 
eq. [3]), test statistics (from eq. [7]), and the numbers of positive and 
negative observations for various periods of time relative to the an- 
nouncement calling for the redemption of an outstanding convertible 
security. The results in table 2, panel A, were generated using the 
after-event estimation period, t = + 181 to t = + 360, relative to 
CED + 20, while those in table 2, panel B, are based on the before- 
event estimation period, t = - 360 to t = - 181, relative to AD. 
In table 2, panels A and B, results for the combined sample are 
presented in column 1, the convertible bonds in column 2, and the 
convertible preferred stocks in column 3. Price behavior before the 
announcement date (AD) during the period AD-60 to AD-2 is similar 
for the combined sample, the bonds only, and the preferred stocks 
only, regardless of the choice of estimation period. In all cases, there 
is a statistically significant positive CAAR, ranging from .047 (Z = 
3.319) for bonds only, using before-event estimation, to .094 (Z = 
4.387) for preferred stocks only, using after-event estimation. For the 
full sample, using after-event estimation, 119 observations have posi- 
tive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) compared to 50 with negative 
CARs.7 The preannouncement run-up reaffirms that documented by 
Mikkelson (1981). 
6. Since the same point estimates of the market model parameters are used to calcu- 
late all of the elements of the time series of abnormal returns for a given security, the 
independence of AR,, and ARjs, s $z t, may not hold. The abnormal return series for 
each security was tested for first-order autocorrelation, and in only six cases out of the 
combined sample of 169 securities was the correlation estimate significant at the 5% 
level. 
7. The probability of drawing at least 119 positive CARs in a sample of 169 given that 
positive and negative CARs are equally probable is less than .001. 
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TABLE 2 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for Selected Intervals 
Surrounding Convertible Security Calls 
Convertible 
Combined Sample Convertible Bonds Preferred Stocks 
(N = 169) (N = 111) (N = 58) 
Interval (1) (2) (3) 
A. Market Model Parameters from After-Event Estimation Period 
AD-60 to AD-2: 
CAAR .090 .088 .094 
t-statistic (6.838) (5.268) (4.387) 
pos/neg CARs 119/50 77/34 42/16 
AD-1 to AD: 
CAAR -.018 -.012 -.015 
t-statistic (- 8.740) (- 7.484) (- 5.863) 
pos/neg CARs 44/125 28/83 16/42 
AD+i toCED: 
CAAR .022 .022 .022 
t-statistic (2.717) (2.044) (1.805) 
pos/neg CARs 108/61 69/42 39/19 
CED + I to CED + 20: 
CAAR .001 .004 .005 
t-statistic (.169) (.358) (- .198) 
pos/neg CARs 85/84 58/53 27/31 
AD+ I to CED + 20: 
CAAR .022 .026 .016 
t-statistic (2.119) (1.717) (1.249) 
pos/neg CARs 94/75 61/50 33/25 
B. Market Model Parameters from Before-Event Estimation Period 
AD-60 to AD-2: 
CAAR .052 .047 .064 
t-statistic (4.353) (3.319) (3.073) 
pos/neg CARs 107/62 70/44 37/21 
AD-1 to AD: 
CAAR -.019 -.021 -.015 
t-statistic (- 9.420) (- 7.639) (-5.514) 
pos/neg CARs 43/123 26/85 17/41 
AD+ Ito CED: 
CAAR .004 .002 .010 
t-statistic (1.348) (.653) (1.397) 
pos/neg CARs 95/74 63/48 32/26 
CED + I to CED + 20: 
CAAR -.012 -.013 -.010 
t-statistic (- 1.866) (- 1.601) (-.951) 
pos/neg CARs 78/91 50/61 28/30 
AD+ I to CED + 20: 
CAAR -.008 -.012 -.000 
t-statistic (-.234) (-.632) (-.476) 
pos/neg CARs 82/87 53/58 29/29 
NOTE.-The announcement date is denoted by AD; CED denotes day conversion ends. The 
designation pos/neg CARS = number of positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)/number of 
negative CARs. 
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The 2-day announcement-period results are also consistent across 
samples and for both estimation periods. For the combined sample 
using before-event estimation (table 2, panel B), the CAAR is -.019 
(Z = - 9.420), and using after-event estimation (table 2, panel A), the 
CAAR is - .018 (Z = - 8.740). For the full sample, using after-event 
estimation, 44 CARs are positive compared to 125 negative CARs. The 
probability of drawing a sample of at least 125 negative CARs is less 
than .0001 (see n. 6 above). Thus, there is evidence of a significant 
negative average price reaction to calls of convertible securities, re- 
gardless of the choice of estimation period, and the result extends to 
the subsamples of bonds and preferred stocks. The finding of a nega- 
tive valuation effect for convertible bond calls is consistent with the 
results of Mikkelson (1981, 1985), Ofer and Natarajan (1987), and 
Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991). The negative wealth effect for con- 
vertible preferred calls reaffirms the finding of Mais, Moore, and Rog- 
ers (1989). 
In each of the panels of table 2, CAAR values are also reported for 
the period following announcement to the day conversion ends (AD + 1 
through CED), the 20-day period following the day conversion ends 
(CED +1 through CED + 20), and the total period AD +1 through 
CED + 20. Use of after-event estimation (table 2, panel A) reveals sig- 
nificant positive average abnormal returns during AD + 1 through CED 
for the combined sample as well as for each subsample. The full sample 
exhibits a CAAR of .022, significant at the 1% level. Positive CARs 
outnumber negative CARs 108 to 61. Results are similar for the con- 
vertible bonds and preferred stocks analyzed separately.8 This finding 
suggests that the negative announcement effect is not entirely perma- 
nent and is consistent with the liquidity-based explanation. When the 
period is extended to AD + 1 through CED + 20, the CAAR for the full 
sample (.022) is positive and significant at the 4% level (Z = 2.119). 
The bond subsample CAAR is .026, significant at the 5% level (Z = 
1.717) under the one-sided alternative. The result for the preferred 
subsample is weaker (CAAR = .016) and significant only at the 11% 
level (Z = 1.249) using a one-tailed test. 
Stock price behavior during the conversion period is described visu- 
ally by graphing CAAR values beginning the day following announce- 
ment (AD +1) and extending to AD + 30, approximating the average 
interval from announcement to the end of conversion. This is done in 
figure 1, panels a and b, for the convertible bond calls and the convert- 
ible preferred stock calls, respectively. The patterns are quite similar 
for the two types of security calls. In both cases, CAAR values appear 
8. For the preferred calls subsample, CAAR = .022 and Z = 1.805, significant at the 
4% level under the one-sided alternative. Positive CARs outnumber negative CARs 39 
to 19; the probability of drawing at least 39 positive CARs in the sample is .006. 
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FIG. 1.-Cumulative average abnormal returns on common stocks for 30 
trading days following calls of convertible bonds and convertible preferred 
stocks; a, Convertible bond calls (N = 111); b, Convertible preferred stock 
calls (N = 58). 
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to be such that prices have recovered substantially by the end of the 
approximate conversion period. The magnitude of postannouncement 
abnormal performance is particularly sensitive to whether prean- 
nouncement (table 2, panel B) or postannouncement returns (table 
2, panel A) are used to estimate the market model parameters. The 
sensitivity of the results in the case of convertible bond calls has been 
pointed out by Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) and 
Cowan, Nayar, and Singh (1990), and the latter study suggests that the 
use of preevent parameter estimates is biased. 
Using preevent estimation for the postannouncement analysis (table 
2, panel B) leads to weaker results. For the period AD+ 1 through 
CED, the full sample has a CAAR value of .004 (Z = 1.348), significant 
at only the 9% level using a one-tailed test. However, positive CARs 
outnumber negative CARs 95 to 74; the probability of drawing at least 
95 positive CARs in this sample is .045. The bond subsample CAAR 
(.002) is not significant at any reasonable level (Z = 0.653), while the 
preferred subsample has a CAAR value of .010, significant at the 8% 
level (Z = 1.397). Positive CARs for the bond sample outnumber nega- 
tive CARs by 63 to 48, and for the preferred stock sample positive 
CARs outnumber negative CARs by 32 to 26.9 Thus, even though the 
parametric results are weak because of the possible bias of preevent 
parameter estimates, the nonparametric results show modest support 
for positive average abnormal price performance during the period of 
conversion (AD + 1 to CED). All of the analyses and tests presented 
in table 2 were repeated using the mean-adjusted returns model. The 
results were parallel to those reported in table 2 for the combined, 
convertible bond, and preferred stock samples for both the after-event 
and before-event estimation periods. Thus, the sensitivity of the results 
is confined to the choice of estimation period, and not to the choice 
of return generating models. 
Previous studies of convertible security calls that report abnormal 
stock returns immediately subsequent to announcement vary as to 
their conclusions. Mikkelson's (1981) data reveal positive cumulative 
raw returns of .88% during the 30-day period following convertible 
bond calls, and 1.05% for the same period following convertible pre- 
ferred calls. Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) report cumu- 
lative average abnormal returns of 1.939% for the 40-day period follow- 
ing convertible bond calls using after-event estimation of the market 
model. With before-event estimation they find a cumulative average 
abnormal return of - 1.10%. Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991), using 
after-event estimation of the market model, find a cumulative average 
abnormal return of 3.62% for the 60-day period following nonunder- 
9. The probabilities of drawing at least 63 positive CARs in the bond sample and at 
least 32 positive CARs in the preferred stock sample are .064 and .179, respectively. 
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written calls of convertible bonds, though their finding is not statisti- 
cally significant (Z = 1.09). For their sample of underwritten calls, 
they find a 4.26% cumulative abnormal return that is significant at the 
8% level (Z = 1.75).10 The tests we have presented should be more 
powerful tests of the conversion-period price behavior because we use 
the date conversion ends for each firm." 
IV. Tests of the Liquidity Hypotheses 
To the extent that the negative price reaction on the announcement 
date is due at least partially to selling pressure, a rebound should be 
in evidence; that is, prices that decline the most should recover the 
most. To examine this we follow Hansen (1988) and estimate the fol- 
lowing model: 
CARj, ],END = 0 + 1ICARj,,,O+ Ej. (8) 
In equation (8), CARj1, ?END is the cumulative abnormal return for 
security j during the period t = AD + 1 through t = CED, the end 
of the conversion period, and CARj, - 1,0 is measured over the 2-day 
announcement period. 
The model (8) is estimated for the convertible bond calls and the 
preferred stock calls, and the results are reported in table 3. The pa- 
rameters Po and ,31 in equation (8) are estimated by weighted least 
squares (WLS), with weights corresponding to the inverse of the stan- 
dard deviation from the return-generating model. The CAR values in 
table 3 that are used to estimate equation (8) are from the market 
model using postevent parameter estimates. For convertible bond calls 
the sign of the estimated slope coefficient (,) is -.606, significant at 
the 1% level (t = -2.551; R2 = .084). This suggests that a 1.0% 
abnormal decline in price upon announcement is followed by a recov- 
ery of about .6%. We interpret these findings as convincing support 
for the liquidity hypothesis; that is, stock prices that decline the most 
10. Ofer and Natarajan (1987) report significant negative price performance for the 
year following convertible bond calls, consistent with the signaling theory of Harris and 
Raviv (1985). We replicated their analysis using the sample described in their article, 
and, using before-event estimation as they did, we find the CAAR for months + 1 through 
+ 12 to be - .101 (Z = - 3.307), consistent with their findings. Using after-event estima- 
tion we find a CAAR of .032 (Z = .401). Thus, the evidence in support of negative 
signaling vanishes when after-event estimation is used. See Cowan, Nayar, and Singh 
(1990) for a more elaborate test that establishes the same finding. 
11. We use the date conversion ends as the last inclusive date for the recovery period 
because it is precisely identifiable. Ideally, we would use the last day on which liquida- 
tion of new shares ends, and this likely occurs after the conversion period ends. This 
date is not observable; however, we repeated the analysis using arbitrarily chosen termi- 
nal dates CED + 5 and CED + 20. The point estimates of the CAAR values remain ap- 
proximately the same. 
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TABLE 3 Price Recovery Tests Based on the Model: 
CARj,+1,END = fo + +CARj,_,0 + Ej 
Po R 
Convertible bonds (N = 111) .002 -.606 .084 
(.245) (-2.551) 
Preferred stocks (N = 58) .032 .739 .100 
(2.352) (1.751) 
NoTE.-The cumulative abnormal return during conversion period = CARJ,+L,END; CARJL-l O 
cumulative abnormal return during announcement period. Parameter estimates (X0,X) are deter- 
mined by weighted least squares. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The CAR value are from 
the market model with after-event parameter estimates. 
because of convertible bond calls recover the most by the time conver- 
sion ends. 
The results for the preferred stock sample are not consistent with 
the liquidity hypothesis. For example, using mixed estimation period 
parameters we find I = .599 with a t-statistic of 1.194. The sign is 
opposite of that predicted. 
Since CARj, + lEND is measured over a considerable amount of time 
for the preferred stock calls (average 26.5 days) and the bond calls 
(average 27.5 days), the price rebound tests may be distorted by firm- 
specific developments that occur during the notice period. Removal of 
observations having other Wall Street Journal announcements during 
the notice period results in a severe reduction in sample size, particu- 
larly in the case of preferred stock calls. Thus, we report two additional 
tests using the full samples that may be less subject to distortion by 
extreme observations. The first employs Kendall's test of concordance 
between CARj, - 1,0 and CARJ + 1,END. The results are similar to those in 
table 3. For the bond sample (N = 111), Kendall's "tau" statistic is 
- .167 using after-event estimation, significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level using a two-tailed test. For the preferred stock sample 
(N = 58), the statistic is .117 for after-event estimation and is not 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level using a two-tailed 
test. 
The final test involves ranking the announcement-period abnormal 
returns (CARj, - O) and grouping the conversion-period abnormal re- 
turns (CARj, +?lEND) according to quartiles of the distributions of 
CARj, - lo. Stocks that suffer the sharpest announcement-period de- 
cline should exhibit the largest recovery. The results are reported in 
table 4. 
The results in table 4 are generally consistent with those in table 
3. Using after-event estimation, convertible bond calls exhibiting the 
sharpest announcement-period stock price decline (quartile 1) show an 
average CAAR over the conversion period of approximately 5%. 
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TABLE 4 Conversion-Period Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Each 
Quartile of Announcement-Period Abnormal Returns 
Convertible 
Combined Sample Convertible Bonds Preferred Stocks 
Quartile of CAR,<I,o (N = 169) (N = 111) (N = 58) 
Distribution (1) (2) (3) 
1 (lowest) .02 .05 -.03 
2 .03 .03 .04 
3 .01 .01 .04 
4 (highest) .03 .00 .05 
NoTE.-The CAR values are from the market model with after-event parameter estimates. 
Those that exhibit the next largest decline (quartile 2) have an average 
CAAR over the conversion period of 3%. Those that exhibit the small- 
est decline (and in some cases positive abnormal returns) are in quartile 
4 and the conversion-period CAAR is approximately zero. The results 
for convertible preferred stock calls are not consistent with a price 
rebound. Thus, the results of this analysis are broadly consistent with 
the results in table 3. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
Calls of in-the-money convertible securities are voluntary steps taken 
by managers, which have been shown to cause negative common share 
price reactions upon announcement. We have argued that the observed 
stock price response may be explained in part by a liquidity cost argu- 
ment similar to that made by Hansen (1988) in the case of rights offers. 
Hansen argues that rights offers leave current shareholders with port- 
folio imbalances that appear to be corrected by selling the new shares. 
Concentrated selling pressure forces a temporary price decline, and 
this represents an additional cost of marketing new shares. Thus, it is 
not clear that rights offerings are truly less costly than general cash 
offers; therefore managerial behavior cannot be judged to be irrational. 
We have made a similar argument in the case of convertible security 
calls, and our argument supplements others such as that made by Har- 
ris and Raviv (1985). The evidence is for the most part consistent for 
calls of convertible bonds and partially consistent for preferred stock 
calls. Calls of both types of securities result in significant negative 
announcement effects, regardless of the choice of estimation period. 
Using an after-event estimation period for market model parameters, 
we find significant positive cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) during the conversion period for the combined sample as 
well as the bonds and preferred stocks separately. Using before-event 
estimation, which, it has been argued, may be biased, the CAARs 
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during the conversion period are positive but not statistically sig- 
nificant. 
For the sample of convertible bond calls, stock prices are found to 
rebound during the conversion period. But the rebound test fails in 
the convertible preferred stock sample, regardless of the choice of 
estimation period. 
For convertible bond calls the weight of the evidence supports the 
liquidity-based explanation we have set forth. While these findings 
cannot rule out other explanations advanced and supported in previous 
research, they are clearly consistent with predictions of the liquidity- 
based explanation, which do not arise in the other explanations. The 
evidence on calls of convertible preferred stocks is mixed, thus our 
findings are not judged fully conclusive for these types of securities. 
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